From 8 to 22 February this year we made a second visit with D4net from the Netherlands to Lebanon. We wanted to speak to our contacts from our first visit in September 2006, and meet new people too. Our main questions were: how do the people on the ground see a way out of the political stalemate between government and opposition? What are the effects of the June war and the internal political struggle? Is a third way possible? What effect does the sectarian system have at present, and what are people’s thoughts on Lebanon in the light of international developments?
In part 1 of this article we try to give an idea of the current situation in Lebanon on the basis of all the discussions we had and our own impressions. In part 2 we attempt to sketch out the conditions that could lead to more positive developments.
We want to emphasise that we do not think that we know better than the Lebanese people themselves. Our idea is more that it can be helpful to read how a relative outsider, who plays no part in Lebanese society and its conflicts, sees the situation.
Part 1: the current situation
It strikes one straight away that Lebanese society is currently strongly polarised along government camp/opposition camp lines. As a result of the opposition’s attempts to gain more influence in the current political balance of power, and the inflexible reaction of the government to this, a stalemate has arisen that is partly paralysing the country. In itself, what the opposition claims – that the division of power in Lebanon is shared unequally, to the advantage of the Sunnis and Druzes in particular, while in numeric terms the Shias form a much larger section of the population – is correct. However, what makes the problem seemingly insoluble is mainly outside interference. The opposition, especially Hezbollah, is probably heavily influenced by Syria and Iran, in order to expand their political power and to frustrate the investigations into the assassination of Hariri. On the other hand, strong pressure is definitely being exerted by the US on the government to make a firm stand. Hezbollah is seen by the US as the greatest threat after Al Qaeda, even though these movements have nothing to do with one another and are also totally different in their aims and organisation. The rising tensions are intensified still further by mysterious attacks and finds of explosives. In reality the situation differs little from the policy of the Bush administration and its slogan ‘you’re either with us or you’re against us’. It leaves no room whatsoever for other voices to be heard. You are either for the government or for the opposition.
In addition, sectarianism causes extra problems because economic, administrative and military power are not equally divided among the sects. Positions of power are mainly concentrated among particular sects. So, for instance, so Sunnis have most of the economic power, and military might is mainly in the hands of Hezbollah.
The damage to the economic life of Beirut thus mainly affects the power of the Sunnis, and the pressure on Hezbollah to disarm represents a direct erosion of their power.
With the effective absence of a democratic state, you could say that economic power is unbridled, and also does not need any more control. It is the free market and globalisation in its most extreme form.
Because it only possesses military power, and has no clear socio-economic plan for Lebanon, Hezbollah has the problem that it needs the threat from Israel. If Israel were to accede to Hezbollah’s demands and a definitive peace were to be achieved, then Hezbollah’s power would largely disappear.
The sectarianism is a many-headed monster. It is not only religious, but is also culturally, socially, economically politically and militarily determined. Political reform alone will not remove it. The question arises of whether this really is such a great problem. The most important problem is the division of economic and political power. It is necessary for a peaceful Lebanon to remove these two areas of division, and to approach the sects from now on from the basis of a national vision founded on equality.
None of the sects or their associated political parties have a clear political-economic or social vision for the country. The only one which does have such a vision is the Communist Party of Lebanon, which has virtually no power. In addition, the party of Aoun, the FPM, had made some steps on the way towards a plan. The sectarian parties are also often led by family clan, with leadership passing from father to son.
What seems most necessary is a change in the electoral system: a reform of political power on the basis of voting that is separate from the sectarian division of power. In particular, space must be created to give opportunities to independent candidates. A mechanism must also be created that obliges parties to have a general political and economic programme. There must be checks on economic power, so that income can be generated for the development of impoverished areas. The development of a number of basic amenities and a genuine campaign against corruption are also necessary. All these issues require a lot of time. They need a change of mentality, and the Lebanese must be given the time for this. It is often forgotten for the sake of convenience that Lebanon has only been independent for a short time since the Middle East was divided up by the western colonial powers, and experienced a lengthy civil war.
There is no civil structure present in Lebanon, for example of citizen’s groups and NGOs that have a clear plan or political stance aimed at social change. There is also hardly any personal space. Many NGOs are dependent on foreign donors who place conditions on grants, such as a prohibition on presenting a political profile. New groups are arising, but these mainly promote a moral message, for example: no violence, no civil war.
Furthermore, there is currently a great deal of division that makes a third way impossible. There is no organisational or conceptual framework that can bring the civil groups together.
The divisions include those between those fiercely anti-Hezbollah, or extremely sympathetic and/understanding of Hezbollah, between groups working towards a socialist society and, especially, among citizens who fear the threat of a new civil war.
There are even more negative developments. Migration has risen. One the one hand, people who were planning to return to Lebanon are postponing this and, on the other, highly educated young people in particular are leaving the country. Various Gulf states have raised their quotas for Lebanese workers, creating an added lure to leave the country.
Unemployment is rising, and so are prices. Everyone is primarily concerned with survival, so that other activities, such as voluntary work for NGOs or civilian organisations, are secondary or in decline. Of course the blows fall the hardest in the poorer areas of Lebanon. The totally destroyed South plays no further role in national discussions, let alone that any policy is being made for it. The people in these types of areas of Lebanon are completely left to their fate.
An important condition for a solution to the problems is that there is no more outside interference, but this interference is actually increasing. It seems as if, after the Gaza strip and Iraq, a third chaotic state or region is in preparation.
Beyond the internal situation, internationally tensions have risen dramatically, and this has a direct effect on Lebanon. The existence of the various sects is abused by foreign powers to further their interests in the region. The influence of Syria and Iraq on Hezbollah is well known, but the Sunnis are used by the US and the Gulf states in the same way. Christian groups in their turn are used by the US and European countries. Hezbollah is the movement in Lebanon that emancipated, organised and thereby gave power to the disadvantaged Shia population. The rise of movements such as Hezbollah is seen as a threat, especially now that these movements have an ideological affinity with Iran. In this way, Lebanon is becoming a reflection of the entire strategic power struggle in the Middle East arena between a superpower, the US, and a regional superpower, Iran.
Israel would like nothing better than to strike the next blow against Hezbollah, and will certainly do so as soon as it can see a reason to attack. Because of its character as a Zionist state, Israel is dependent for its existence on the position of hegemony that it occupies in the Middle East. Every force that impinges on that must be fought against in order to survive. In addition, Israel has always been the most important ally of the US in the Middle East.
So things are looking grim for Lebanon, yet still there are some points of light. It is still possible that, under internal and external pressure, the US will abandon an attack on Iran, and will be forced to pursue a less military and confrontational course. This can also create more space in Lebanon, and less polarisation.
A great deal of money has been invested in Lebanon by the Sunni camp and the Gulf states in recent years. A civil war is not in their interests. Hezbollah too has nothing to gain from rising internal violence, and has stated time and time again that it will do all in its power to prevent this. It seems that there are many people within Lebanon who absolutely want to prevent a civil war, and are increasingly vocal in expressing this. There is a strong aversion to a war within the Christian community, and in this way indirect criticism is made of the inflammatory statements of GeaGea, the leader of the Christian Lebanese Forces of the government camp.
The problem lies more with smaller parties and organisations that are often controlled from outside. Just as groups mainly allied with Al Qaeda succeeded in using attacks to unleash a civil war in Iraq, this could also occur in Lebanon. Writing in the New Yorker, Seymour Hersh points to the suspected support of the US for smaller extremist Sunni groups in Lebanon. Western security services talk of hundreds of Sunni extremists who are heading for Lebanon from various countries. They have the greatest chance of success at a time of political and economic stagnation like the present. The opportunities for recruiting young people without prospects of a better life are increasing. These organisations see both Shias and Christians as unbelievers who can, or even must, be killed. They can also threaten to carry out bloody attacks on Israel, with a predicable reaction from Israel. A number of these groups are present in the (overwhelmingly Sunni) Palestinian refugee camps, where there are no prospects of betterment for young people. Here too, then, a non-Lebanese conflict is being fought out on Lebanese soil.
From an international perspective, Lebanon has little or no influence on developments. Nationally, however, initiatives for change have some chance of success.
The pressure for this will have to come from civil society and from the diaspora. None of the parties in either the government or the opposition want to initiate a genuine transformation of society: it would mean a loss of power both for the sects and for the families within the sects.
Part II: A civil network for change
To achieve a genuine change in Lebanon requires a union of forces from civil society, a union in the form of a network.
The network must be broad and challenging, and express the hope for all Lebanese that ‘society will be changed by us in the time to come’. It must also articulate a vision of how much is possible if Lebanon changes: how everyone will benefit.
Even if it seems no more than a drop in the ocean now, a start has to be made somewhere: not immediately looking at the achievability of the ultimate goal, but getting involved in how you want to live, instead of how you are forced to live.
A condition for all this is that there must be a recognition that there is a communal problem that can only be solved communally. A broad group of people from various backgrounds and social positions must acknowledge this, and express their will as citizens to take a communal initiative.
Starting from the situation as it is now, a number of aims can be formulated that everyone can relate to despite their great differences, aims where everyone can see that they are conditions for a real change. The means may be very diverse, as long as they are recognisable as a part of the general aim.
The network must also map out a recognisable strategy, or multiple strategies, for achieving this aim. Ultimately the network can, through the activities that take place within it, form a political force to change society.
Through its very existence the network will support and stimulate social initiatives that make change a reality.
A discussion on the politics of the network that is mainly focussed on what is the ideologically correct course should be guarded against. Whatever ideology you follow on a national level, nothing is possible as long the present system continues to exist. No single ideology, whether it is socialism, liberalism or an ideology based on religion, will lead to change at the national level or a revolution that replaces the system. What is needed right now is the creation of conditions in which an authentic political discussion and struggle can take place. A movement must arise with pragmatic goals that make this possible. The creation of public forums is of great importance in this. Political parties and organisations can better be excluded, or only assigned a limited role in the network. They should however be allowed to express their sympathies and support.
The acceptance of great diversity is an essential condition for an effective network that can change society. Whatever the ultimate solution or form of society for Lebanon as a whole may be: at the moment, every attempt at development is blocked. The power that breaks through the blockages must come from civil society, so that the foundations can be laid for a new Lebanon.
Security could be a central theme within the network: security and protection against internal military violence as well as external threats, with a firm condemnation of all political violence by anyone. In addition, security in terms of social exclusion, cultural exclusion, income, housing etc. is equally important.
People will always choose for something on the basis of their own interests, and their foremost interest is in security for themselves and their immediate family and friends. It must be clear that the only guarantee of this for all Lebanese people is a non-sectarian society. Having various loyalties, religions or cultures does not need to be a barrier to practical agreements on a non-sectarian basis on the leadership of the country, its division of income, cultural exchange, legal power and security.
A basic principle for the creation of security is that people within the borders of Lebanon form an organisational union. Countries and their borders are a fact. They offer people within those borders the possibility to organise how they relate to one another.
A national form of government and administrative apparatus should choose for the relief of emergency situations and for the protection for all those within Lebanon. This applies to legal, military, political and economic issues. The interests of Lebanese society as a whole are chiefly a stake in, and a loyalty to, a society that refrains from nationalism. Nationalism is in fact a sectarian phenomenon on a national level. Lebanon in particular is a country that has great a interest in open borders, both internally and towards the outside world.
It is vitally important to develop activities on the division lines and borders that exist within Lebanon itself.
An armed party such as Hezbollah is undesirable but, at the same time, Lebanon as a whole must be able to give guarantees for the protection of Lebanon, whether that is against Israel or against Syria.
An unrestrained concentration of economic power among the Sunni elite would be disastrous for the economic development of Lebanon as a whole.
Development and security for all is only possible, then, if everyone takes on the responsibility for guaranteeing security for all.
The current system in Lebanon is outdated. It is anachronistic, and developments in many areas are being held back. The old politic elite – based on sects and family structures – must fade away. A young generation must then take over on the basis of a self-determined course that looks to the future and is appropriate in an open world.
It is all about bringing about a change of consciousness. This also means initiating a national debate about the Lebanese civil war. Coming to terms with this part of Lebanon’s history is essential, because the sectarian power of today has also partly grown out of it. The Taif agreements at the end of the civil war did stop the fighting, but they allowed the sectarianism to continue, and even reinforced it.
The network has to stimulate people to enter into discussions with their families and work colleagues when they hear prejudiced remarks between sects: discussions about the history of Lebanon. Change in Lebanon is only possible if something changes in the mentality of the people themselves.
Diaspora
A separate point for attention is the diaspora. More Lebanese people live and work outside of Lebanon than inside it, some for 150 years or more already, but there are also many who have left or fled in the last 30 years. These Lebanese in the diaspora often still have links with Lebanon. Departures are sometimes seen as only temporary. By staying in other countries, mainly with democratic governments, it can be seen that these systems are preferable to sectarianism. Contact with civil marriage, rights for women and gay people etc. can also bring about a change in mentality. This can be of great influence on the situation in Lebanon, even if this only means a flow of funds in the direction of initiatives like the ones we have described in this article. It can be expected that the number of (young) Lebanese who want to see a different political future will rise. Alongside financial contributions, the diaspora, united in Lebanese associations for example, can also make its voice heard other ways, and try to exercise influence (for example on family members remaining in Lebanon).
Contacts outside of Lebanon can also be intensified: contacts for reflection, knowledge exchange, support and advice. These may be contacts with people with experience in broad civil movements, such as the ones in Eastern Europe that gave an impetus for political change there, but contacts with smaller and larger organisations in the fields of human rights, culture and art can also make an important contribution. Activities therefore definitely do not have to be only political. They can just as well take place in cultural and social fields.
Some activities around which a network can form itself are:
- Using creativity, diversity, humour, art and culture – which the Lebanese are strong in – instead of (often imported) weighty ideologies
- Developing as far as possible public forums where thoughts and cultural expressions can be exchanged. These can be debating centres, radio, wall newspapers, magazines, websites, and so on.
- A national information/archive centre for research into Lebanese history, especially the civil war, and into current events, as a means of opening up a national discussion
- Making referendums or other forms of consultation available to the people, so that the knowledge and experience of the people as a whole can be utilised
- Making use of ‘the great outdoors’ for exchanges and image enhancement
- Organising ‘border camps’ on the borders within Lebanese society
- A set logo or other form of recognition. With this, an overarching identity can be given to the various initiatives.
Finally:
There are undoubtedly many other visions of and efforts for change. We hope that this article can contribute to them. We can help to bring different people together to formulate a national initiative. We also want to support existing initiatives. Furthermore, we can attempt to help to organise support from outside of Lebanon.
By: Ed Hollants
D4net, Amsterdam 27/03/2007
The delegation from D4net to Lebanon was made up of Henk van der Keur and Ed Hollants.
D4net@xs4all.nl
www.d4net.nl