D4net Netwerk voor Dromers, Denkers, Durvers en Doeners

Original in dutch: Amsterdam oktober 16, english translation: Amsterdam november 26, 2006

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In this article we want to draw some conclusions from our visit to Lebanon from 11 to 27 September 2006, concerning Israel’s attack on Lebanon and its aftermath. This article mainly concerns the resistance movement and political party Hizbullah.

First, some introductory remarks. We want to find a way between the position that ‘my enemy’s enemy is my friend’ – in other words unconditional support for Hizbullah – and the position that Hizbullah is a terrorist fundamentalist movement that has to be fought. Both positions are problematic. With our journey to Lebanon, we wanted to see the situation with our own eyes instead of merely relying on articles written by others. We think that we can make a more informed opinion by testing our previously gained knowledge against reality.

Reports of the conversations that we had in Lebanon have been published on our website. In addition, we have expressed our opinions on the impressions we gained in various forums. What has been badly received in some quarters is that we have approached the Hizbullah movement / party quite neutrally, and given an account of the positive experiences and impressions that many Lebanese people have of Hizbullah.

We have been criticised for this, with responses such as that Hizbullah should be seen as an Islamic-fascist movement. We take the view that, with this position, any discussion on Hizbullah is made impossible. If you condemn someone as a fascist or a terrorist this amounts to a final judgement. You don’t allow any doubts on it, and you don’t participate in discussions with the group that has been so condemned. But it also goes further: just as with the indiscriminate use of the concept ‘terrorist’, the term Islamic-fascism shows that you are quickly faced with a sense of self-censorship, or in any case that every article you write has to begin with the remark that of course you want to combat Hizbullah or that you of course are against terrorism. What is more, every criticism of Israel has to be prefaced with the statement that of course you think that Israel has the right to exist.

In truth, the pressure arising from this is beginning to become more threatening to freedom of expression than the ‘cartoon issue’ or the gagging of a writer. There is in fact a broad discussion on this, and many are actively aligning themselves with the right to freedom of expression in these cases.

There is also another, more insidious process. You don’t like to say what you think any more, because you are immediately treated aggressively and are dismissed as a friend of fascists or a supporter of terrorists.

We also have great difficulty with the way that opponents are constantly compared with fascists. With this, from our point of view, the concept is increasingly emptied of meaning, and the historical development of fascism in Europe and especially Germany is stripped of its unique character. The term is consciously used with the emotional load of Jew-baiting.

In this article, therefore, we do not want to make any apology for our positive notes on Hizbullah.

Civilian targets

Our journey to Lebanon brought us into contact with a wide range of people: aid workers, artists, representatives of political parties, journalists, taxi drivers, scientists, and so on. We also saw a considerable part of Lebanon: Beirut, the south of Lebanon and the Bekaa Valley.

First we witnessed the destruction caused by Israel’s attack, and the impact that has had on Lebanon and the Lebanese people. To begin with Beirut: the city has mainly remained intact, but the part which was bombed – the Dahieh area – has been partly flattened. The buildings are mainly nine-storey apartment buildings, mostly homes. It is estimated that tens of thousands of houses have been totally destroyed. In the direction to the south and to the Bekaa Valley, all overpasses and highways have been bombed, in the Bekaa Valley most of the factories too. Now Lebanon has almost no industry, because all of the industry that was present has been largely destroyed.

It was also conspicuous that the fuel tanks at the airport and the power station with an oil terminal south of Beirut had both been set on fire by aerial attacks. In general, the villages in the south have been between 30% and 70% destroyed. Most of the targets destroyed did not serve any direct military purpose. Therefore the conclusion is that it has been attempted to damage the land and the economy in order to minimize the basis for Hizbullah’s resistance.

Stories of Israeli planes and helicopters shooting to kill civilians are numerous. A well-known example is that of refugees at Marwaheen, which has been mentioned in the international press. Robert Fisk, among others, has written about this particular case. It concerns civilians who were forced by Israel to leave their houses immediately. Protection at a UN post was refused. A convoy of refugees left in a northerly direction, and was fired on by Israeli missiles: there were 20 deaths, among them 9 children.

It seems evident that Israel has been committing war crimes. The example above already shows this. However, it is apparent to anyone that cluster bomb attacks, of which 90% were carried out in the last 72 hours of the war (when it was already known that a ceasefire was imminent), were nothing other than an attempt to depopulate the south of Lebanon for an extended period.

Up to the time of writing, 12 October 2006, 770 sites have been counted where cluster bombs have landed. Since the war, 18 civilians have died and 120 have been wounded, and the numbers are steadily rising. 30 to 40% of the bombs have failed to go off. Meanwhile, it is estimated that up to a million unexploded cluster bombs are scattered throughout Lebanon, mainly in the south. Because half of the population is dependent on agriculture, this will have grave consequences for the future, not only for this year’s harvests but also for next year’s. Land that is not accessible cannot be cultivated. Israel still refuses to give specific information about the cluster munitions fired, or maps with the locations where they were aimed. The maps that Israel has given to the UN are deemed worthless by the mine clearance teams.
Israel responds to its critics as always, as the victim, and as if Israel as a Jewish state should be treated in a different way from other nations. The Israeli Foreign Affairs spokesman Mark Regev said of those who criticise the use of cluster bombs by Israel: “They hold the Jewish state to another standard.” Here he compares Israel’s use of cluster bombs with that of the US, Britain and NATO, who have also used cluster bombs on populated areas in recent conflicts. Further, it is used as an excuse that the use of cluster munitions has not been banned.

Hizbullah’s bombardments of Israeli towns and villages have also been labelled war crimes, though there has been an interesting discussion on whether there are extenuating circumstances for Hizbullah, because they always fired the missiles as a response to Israeli bombardments. For Hizbullah it was the only means of defence in the sense that it was a means to force Israel to accept a ceasefire. This was the aim of Hizbullah from the start. They wanted to have an exchange of prisoners as soon as possible. Israel avoided every non-military solution, and extended the war ever further, both in terms of targets and of tactics (a ground offensive, cluster bombs). From the moment that it was apparent that Israel would lose the war it had to be saved by the US with the help of a UN resolution.

Because of the attacks on citizens and civilian structures, the anger among the Lebanese people is overwhelming. You hardly hear any criticism of Hizbullah, for example about the captives Israel has taken, but mainly support for their resistance against the Israeli occupation of parts of South Lebanon. There is also hardly anyone who doesn’t see that it is in fact not about the captured soldiers, but all about the weakening of Hizbullah as a power that dares to face up to Israel and the US.

This is supported by an opinion poll by the Jordan-based Center for Strategic Studies (CSS). The survey was carried out among 1,200 Lebanese people from all sections of the population, and published on 12 October 2006. Of the Lebanese people questioned, 78% said that the war was coming regardless of whether the Israeli soldiers were captured by Hizbullah or not. It also emerged that 84% saw the war as a preparatory attempt by Israel and the US to form a new regional order in the Middle East. On the question of whether the war has winners or losers the thinking was divided. Israel was seen as defeated by 37% of the respondents, and about half of them thought that Lebanon was the biggest loser. The differences on many issues between different sections of the population are striking. For example, a majority of the Druzes condemn the capture of Israeli soldiers, while most of the Shi’ites defend this act. Christians and Sunnis fall somewhere in between these two positions.

Hizbullah’s national agenda

If there is one thing that our contacts with Hizbullah have made clear, it is the movement’s emphasis on national issues. This was also to be heard in the latest speeches of Nasrallah. “We are Lebanese, we were born as Lebanese and we will die as Lebanese.” Hizbullah is repeatedly- presented as a Lebanese party that wants to work towards a strong, non-sectarian Lebanese state. That is, of course, exactly what the majority of the Lebanese people want to hear. If one thing is clear in Lebanon then it is people’s total distrust of politics. The people have never known anything other than corruption and sectarianism. Many young people in particular don’t want that any more, and hope for a change. The Lebanese state as an institution in the public interest barely exists.

This was shown again by the absence of aid work by the government during and after the war, and the slowness of state institutions to act, and their initial absence, in the reconstruction. Stories are already circulating about corruption surrounding the reconstruction. In Lebanon the army amounts to nothing and the police force barely exists. In the first instance everyone looks for protection and support to their family or sect. In this respect, the recent war shows a hopeful development that is apparent from the power of a large number of secular grassroots organizations that have joined hands in their support of civilians in the south, and could not and cannot be ignored by Hizbullah because of their energy and effectiveness.

An interesting point here is that a number of these grassroots organizations have make it their aim to start a democratic debate with Hizbullah, and that their practical aid work on the spot makes it impossible for Hizbullah to verbally attack these groups (among them a lesbian and gay group from Beirut) in public on their basic principles. Besides this, these groups have succeeded in finding a way in to the south, which is dominated by Hizbullah, for the first time since the 1980’s. This means that Hizbullah and their supporters are making contact with dissidents, and will have to respond to that. Strikingly, in the conversations we have had with representatives of these groups – and also with those of more established political parties – there is a conviction that Hizbullah can be moved in a democratic and secular direction in an internal Lebanese debate.

Questions are raised by a number of people about the influence of Iran and Syria on Hizbullah. Is Hizbullah mainly waging war in the interests of Iran and Syria, and is Hizbullah therefore an extension of these states? In fact this is the same question as that of whether Israel is only acting as an executive body in the interests of the United States. Both are nonsense. Hizbullah has a national agenda, and takes its own decisions. However, Hizbullah has to seriously take into account the wishes of Iran and Syria, because Hizbullah is dependent on these states for money and weapons. This also applies to the relationship between Israel and the United States. We heard from several people that Hizbullah is trying quite hard to reduce their financial dependence by making their own investments abroad and also increasing their own financial income in Lebanon.

More specifically, we tried to find out what kind of organization Hizbullah is: what do their own supporters think of Hizbullah, what do the Hizbullah leaders themselves think, and what is the view of others on Hizbullah?
At this moment Hizbullah is undoubtedly popular, both within Lebanon itself and in the Arab world as a whole. They know how to exploit the results of the war by appealing to “regained pride”, having defeated Israel under the slogan “the Divine Victory”. They also show by the efficient way in which the reconstruction is taking place that there is an alternative to the corrupt manner in which the Lebanese state operates.

With this, Hizbullah are able to increase their political power. At this moment nobody can do anything without Hizbullah. The “memorandum of understanding” that was agreed before the war (in February 2006) between Hizbullah and the Free Patriotic Movement of former general Aoun of the Lebanese Army has prevented internal fighting in Lebanon. Following the Cedar Revolution, Aoun returned to Lebanon after 14 years in exile in France because of his anti-Syrian stance. The FPM state that they represent 30% of the Lebanese people, particularly Maronite Christians. Apart from Hizbullah, it is the only large party with a real political following that is not ‘bought’. Together with Hizbullah, they represent about 60% of the Lebanese people.

When the election system that is based on a proportional representation of the population groups is changed into a truly democratic system of proportional representation, then there is a high probability that Hizbullah together with the FPM will get a majority of the votes. Also, the FPM states that they want to get rid of the sectarian society that Lebanon is nowadays.

Foreign presence

The last word has not yet been said about Hizbullah’s profit and loss account. The psychological profit, and arising from it the populist profit that has been gained is clear. Hizbullah is ‘the resistance movement’ of the Middle East, admired by Shi’ites as well as Sunnis. The question is, however, the extent to which their option for military resistance has been reduced. The massive presence of international military forces and the Lebanese Army in the South can lead to no other conclusion than that the freedom of movement of Hizbullah has been affected. It seems difficult to imagine that the international military forces will ever use their weapons against Hizbullah, but the threshold for Hizbullah to undertake armed action against Israel has been raised. Also, Hizbullah have to keep up morale among the population in the South as they return to their totally destroyed villages. A lot of energy has to be put into attempts to make life bearable in surroundings where the crops have been destroyed, or harvesting and sowing are impossible because of the cluster bombs which are scattered everywhere. In addition, there are so many international and Lebanese soldiers present in a limited area that every village and every connecting road will be assigned military posts and patrols. Hizbullah, which has agreed to the presence of the troops, may state that they have to be there for the defence of Lebanon against Israeli aggression, but the impression will be of a military occupied area. And of course everyone knows that in reality UNIFIL is there especially to protect Israel and not Lebanon.

Until now Hizbullah has never violated the ceasefire, while Israel is doing so on an almost daily basis, for example by violating Lebanese airspace. This is the same situation as before the war. Israel violated the truce numerous times following the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon. Hizbullah has more or less abided by it, with the exception that they think that military action around Shebaa Farms is justified, because it is an area occupied by Israel (there is a debate going on about whether it belongs to Lebanon or Syria: the UN says Syria). Furthermore, Hizbullah states that they do not carry out any attacks on Israel, but only on Israeli airplanes that invade Lebanese airspace.

The taking of hostages is seen as a legitimate action in order to force the Israelis to release the Lebanese still detained in Israel. In the last war the massive missile attacks on Israel started after the massive bombardments of Lebanon by Israel.

Previously there were 2000 UNIFIL soldiers in the south, now 15,000 Lebanese soldiers and 15,000 UNIFIL soldiers are coming to the south as a consequence of Resolution 1701. This will inevitably lead to problems and opposition among the population. The pressure on Hizbullah will increase everywhere. What are Iran and Syria demanding from Hizbullah for the future in exchange for the financial support that is needed for reconstruction, and further military support? Hizbullah has to find a way to keep its own supporters satisfied, despite the enormous problems concerning the reconstruction in the economically heavily-hit south. How does Hizbullah aim to maintain the support it now has, including support from outside of its traditional Shi’ite power base, after the intoxication of victory gives way to the hangover of reconstruction?

How does the relatively open and tolerant face shown to the outside world relate to Hizbullah’s own basis, that lies partly in the Iranian Islamic revolution? It seems that a strong Lebanese state can only possibly exist as a secular state. How does that relate to the religious ideological basis of Hizbullah? Besides this, the US and Israel will do everything they can to weaken the movement: militarily, politically, economically, and so on. These are enormous challenges. Until now it seems that Hizbullah is playing the game very cleverly and tactically. The challenges they face, and the solutions to them, can give rise to a middle way, a form of political Islam that runs a middle course between a fundamentalist and a liberal/secular society, a stage in an independent development towards welfare, freedom and democracy. It can also, of course, go in the opposite direction simply because of unjustified pressure felt from outside. Still, what we have seen gives hope for positive developments. That also has to do with the specific Lebanese situation in which the struggle for an Islamic state with a more or less closed character has no chance of success because of the composition of the population. Hizbullah already made clear long ago that it no longer aims for this.
Looking to the regional and global consequences, then the defeat of Israel has been of enormous significance. The possibility of an attack on Iran has been reduced. Israel will need a long time to adjust their whole military apparatus and strategic thinking to the new situation. Unfortunately, it seems that their frustrations are especially being given rein on the Palestinians. Most Arab rulers, who have already had to increasingly distance themselves from the US because of the war in Iraq and the openly confessed partiality of the US towards Israel in the conflict with the Palestinians, have to take serious care. The Arab populations are stirring more and more. The US is losing more and more face and influence. The balance of power in the Middle East is shifting, and Israel and the US will be the losers in this.

Enough questions and doubts

There are other important questions to which there are no immediate answers. How democratic is Hizbullah as a movement in itself? Who takes the decisions? As a threatened resistance movement you can avoid these questions for security reasons. Now that Hizbullah has been in government and parliament for some time, and also see the formation of a strong Lebanese state as one of their most important tasks, the question of democracy comes to the fore. This also applies to the Islamisation of society that is encapsulated in their religious basis. Will Hizbullah further distance itself from this, which in fact it cannot, because it is contrary to their religious and ideological basis? How does Hizbullah, which says it is against sectarianism, prevent itself from becoming sectarian itself? Hizbullah is a Shi’ite movement. Will they open themselves to people from other religious traditions? What happens with the money which Hizbullah puts into the reconstruction, is this only given out to Shi’ite businesses?

In addition, there is the emotional heavily-loaded theme of anti-Semitism. There are statements by Nasrallah circulating on the internet that are said to prove that Hizbullah is anti-Jewish. Here we have to add a few critical observations: there are statements whose source is not reliable and/or is the subject of discussion, and there are statements where ‘Zionist’ has been replaced by ‘Jewish’. However, there certainly remain a number of statements that can be called anti-Semitic. For example Al Manar, Hizbullah’s television broadcasting company, has televised a drama series that among other things led to massive protests in France, because the series affirmed the idea of a Zionist world domination conspiracy. These must be condemned without reservation. However, you can also try to understand some statements, without glossing over them. For example, you can imagine that every Palestinian sees every Israeli as a Jew and, with that, every Jew as someone who suppresses him in all possible ways, through which there arises prejudice against Jews. But is that right? Of course not.

Is anti-Semitism at the core of the politics of Hizbullah? There is no proof. It seems that the anti-Jewish statements are particularly based on religious grounds and a literal interpretation of the Koran. Compare this with Israel. Many more statements have been found in Israel from politicians and others in leading executive positions about Arabs that are plainly racist than you will find from Hizbullah about Jews. Besides, it is clear that the policy of Israel is not restricted to statements alone. Does the one justify the other? No, of course not.
We often look at things from own Western perspective without placing ourselves in the position of others. Our perspective is informed by the anti-Semitism which has taken place in our countries: the burden of shame that innocent citizens have been murdered because of being Jews.

In Lebanon and Palestine there have been 60 years of war, violence and ethnic cleansing that have been caused for a greater part by the foundation of the state of Israel, a state that does not fail to stress that they are a Jewish state.

What is striking in discussions with and analyses of Hizbullah is that it makes a distinction between Zionism and being Jewish. Hizbullah fights against the Zionist state of Israel. Besides Zionism, the term Christian-Zionism is also used as a term for the right-wing Christian pro-Zionist lobby in the US. In comparison with Lebanon, Hizbullah states for example that in Lebanon people can follow different religions, and that this does not make the one inferior to the other in the eyes of the state, while Israel is only open for one religion. Another statement: “It is Zionism that Muslims criticise, not Judaism or the Jewish nation — Muslims respect all God’s religions, prophets and messengers”.

That you don’t accept the Zionist state Israel and think that it has to be destroyed or abolished is a position that can be well defended, just as with the apartheid state in South Africa at the time. You can’t agree with that and put it to discussion. There is also a discussion possible on how you look at this Zionist state or want to see it disappear. This is something different from equating anti-Zionism with anti-Semitism and racism, from which you can say that these are things that can’t be discussed, but are offensive.

Hizbullah is a movement that is developing strongly: a development that is moving away from religious fundamentalism and where rational political assessments are starting to push aside religious affairs. There are in our experience indications of a form of openness that can lead to criticism and debate. The people of Hizbullah are approachable and they make – they say themselves – efforts to have contacts with others. Within Lebanon this can be seen in their cooperation with the Christian FPM and contacts with other factions. But Hizbullah also looks outside the Arab world for contacts to explain its aspirations and receive criticism. In recent years Hizbullah as well as Hamas have offered openings for discussions with the US and the West in general. They stress that they have nothing against the West, but are fighting against the Israeli occupation. Al Qaida has been condemned many times, and it is even said that this movement is a bigger danger for Hizbullah than for the West.

Hizbullah wants recognition as a legitimate Lebanese political party, the liberation of the Chebaa Farms and the release of Lebanese prisoners in Israel. In addition, Hizbullah supports others such as Syria and the Palestinians in their fight to regain occupied areas, including an armed struggle to accomplish that. Moreover, they state that the Palestinians must decide for themselves the form that peace with Israel must take: ‘We don’t want to be more Palestinian than the Palestinians themselves’. Yet every attempt to exchange ideas or make contact is answered by the US with a slam of the door.
It seems that what the US is concerned with is not coexistence, nor an unbridgeable ideological or cultural divide. More likely, it seems that movements such as Hizbullah damage the interests of the US too much, and therefore the struggle against them is wrapped up in a story about terrorism, democracy and values: a wrapping that hides the reality and prevents any dialogue from taking place.

Propaganda

An issue which is also continually returned to is the position of women. With this, the image of the repressed woman under the Taleban regime is projected onto the image of the women of Hizbullah.

The position of women has not been very different than in many other countries, and is not the same as those of the religious fundamental movements, for example the Taleban. In numerous cases, lies or half truths on the internet are passed on from one to the other and taken as correct. Hizbullah is said to enforce clothing rules on the streets of Lebanon. Nothing of this sort has been seen by us, and neither have we heard of it from politically active women. Women walk everywhere in the Shi’ite quarters of Beirut and in the villages of the south, and they talk with men. There is a greater chance of seeing burqas in Amsterdam than in Beirut, and the number of women with headscarves is no different from in, for example, the Baarsjes neighbourhood of Amsterdam.

Lebanon is said to be filled with posters and billboards with images of Iranian and other Islamic fundamentalist leaders. We found one billboard with such an image and, judging by the flags on the image, it was from Amal and not from Hizbullah.

Women are said to be not allowed to hold important positions. However, we have recently talked with Rima Fakhry, a woman member of the political council of Hizbullah, the highest political organ of Hizbullah. She is the only woman, and concerning this issue there is still a long struggle ahead, but the signal is that this position is open to women.

In this framework there is a recent example of how easy it has been to influence public opinion. In October 2005 the Iranian president Ahmadenijad is said to have stated during the conference “The World without Zionism” in Tehran: “Israel must be wiped off the map”. This statement was condemned across the whole world. In the Dutch newspapers too this statement is still quoted in almost every article on Iran. The suggestion is clear: according to Ahmadenijad the Jews have to be driven into the sea.

However, from the beginning it has been proved that this concerns an incorrect translation of the speech. Ahmadenijad quoted an old statement of Khomeini: “the occupation regime over Jerusalem must be erased from the page of time.” Questions can be raised about how debatable such a statement is. However, it is not a call for genocide. Enough can be said about anti-Semitism and the person of Ahmadenijad, but then only in line with the facts and not in the form of propaganda lies.

It is hammering on an open door to state how important propaganda is, and that truth is the first casualty of war. Yet still we seem to be caught out every time. The propaganda battle in which websites, weblogs and discussion forums are used has been raised to high levels in the era of the world wide web. Pro-Israeli users of the internet are exhorted to take part in the virtual discussion of the war in Lebanon. Anyone who subscribes to the website giyus.org receives a warning each time that the image of Israel is in danger in a discussion or in a poll somewhere on the world wide web. The system works with the small program ‘Megaphone’, which displays a small screen with the particular link. Giyus – which stands for Give Israel Your United Support – focuses on 100,000 propagandists.

What is striking about the recent war is that in the field of news Hizbullah was more trustworthy than Israel. The Israeli news was much more influenced by propaganda lies than the news from Hizbullah. One of the small number of cases on which Hizbullah kept silent or clearly gave too low figures was the number of fighters killed. For the rest, the news on the course of the war was mostly accurate, while in Israel it appeared every time that the declarations of politicians and army spokesmen were not true.

Remain critical

Hizbullah is without any doubt a movement striving after military, economical and political power, and for this reason alone it is important to follow the organization very critically. At the same time, one can say that it is also the movement that actually affects the power of Israel and the US in Lebanon and the Middle East. If one sees the interference of Israel and the US as the main blockade to peace, security, democracy and independent development chosen by the people themselves in the Middle East, then Hizbullah having an effect on their power offers some hope.

We should be careful not to make the same mistake with the left-wing movements now as in the past, when a blind eye was turned to objectionable or blameworthy phenomena such as an authoritarian character, the position of women, and personality cults, because the movements were leading an anti-imperialistic course.

Hizbullah is not a left-wing or socialist movement, but a national liberation movement. In addition, it is questionable whether one can define the world – and certainly movements such as Hizbullah – in left-wing / right-wing terms. Hizbullah stems from a world with its own history and own development which it maintains, rather than adopting the products of our Western society.

The question is what stance we, as movements that have stemmed from a left-wing ideological world, have to take with regard to Hizbullah. It seems right to us to approach Hizbullah with openness, and with sympathy for the liberating nature of their struggle against the predominance of Israel and the US.
At the same time, it is right to criticise, and to support groups in Lebanon in their criticism of the democratic nature and the freedom-limiting developments within the movement itself. We prefer to support those groups that in fact mainly fall into the category of grassroots organizations. We also have to change the dominant image of Hizbullah in the West if we are to escape from the dangerous developments that are currently taking place.

Islamic people’s movements in the Middle East will play an increasingly important role in the future. They combine resistance against economical domination and resistance against corrupt leaders with resistance against cultural and ideological domination. In this context one can think about the communal thinking within Islam against individualism. After more than a century of colonialism and western interference, these movements are a response to this, and have a liberating as well as a new form of oppressive character. It seems right to us to pay attention to both, and not to see one independently from the other, especially in the case of Hizbullah.

Ed Hollants
Henk van der Keur
Sjoerd Bosch